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Motivation
The Lindahl equilibrium is one of the most prominent concepts in the theory of public goods that, in the context of the intensified interest in transnational public goods as combating global warming, has attained more attention in the last years 1 . According to Lindahl's concept every agent acts as a cost-share taker who, being confronted with an adequately chosen individualised price, wants to consume the same amount of the public good. The allocation characterised in this way is Pareto efficient and thus the Lindahl solution is quite parallel to a competitive market equilibrium for private goods. The attractiveness of Lindahl's construction mainly lies in this analogy, which is mostly used to provide the motivation for the concept 2 . Based on a purely artificial price mechanism this usual justification of the Lindahl equilibrium, however, is not directly linked to the allocation problem as stated by Lindahl (1919 Lindahl ( /1958 himself: How much of a public good should be provided and how should the costs of the public good be shared among the agents such that the resulting allocation can be considered as "just" and can thus be expected as the outcome of a "free agreement" between the agents involved?
In the literature there are a few attempts to bridge this gap and to provide an alternative motivation for the Lindahl equilibrium referring to equity or fairness concepts. In Silvestre's (1984) voluntariness approach the Lindahl outcome was identified as an allocation in which no agent would prefer to get a reduction of public-good supply accompanied by a proportional reduction of its contribution to the public good. Sato (1987) , by a specific construction, characterized the Lindahl solution as an envy-free allocation in which no agent would want to interchange its position with someone else. Van and Sandler, 1996 ) the Lindahl solution can be based directly on simple equity conditions the most well-known of which is the benefit principle. Following its classical interpretation, eve-ryone should pay for a public good according to his marginal willingness to pay. For each individual this means a "quid pro quo"-exchange as it is given in competitive markets for private goods. In this paper we want to show in addition that, in the case of public goods, the benefit principle can be related to equity norms concerning the distribution of public-good contributions among the parties. So, in particular, we assume that in the solution agreed upon each agent should carry the same burden for financing the public good after differences in willingness to pay have been taken into account. It turns out that this postulate for distributional equity combined with Pareto efficiency leads to the Lindahl equilibrium without invoking a Walrasian auctioneer. The relationship between equity postulates and the Lindahl equilibrium partly seems to be some kind of "common knowledge" in the theory of public goods.
The aim of this paper is to make the intuition behind more explicit and thus to give a more transparent and sound normative foundation of the Lindahl solution.
Axiomatic Characterisations of the Lindahl Solution
We consider a standard public-good economy with n agents. Each agent i has an exogenously given income i y . Preferences are characterized by the utility function (,)
ii uxG where 0 i x ≥ denotes agent i 's private consumption and 0 G ≥ is the provision level of a public good. All utility functions are assumed to have the usual properties: they are strict monotonously increasing in both types of consumption, twice continuously differentiable for (x i ,G) > 0, strictly quasi-concave, and the private as well as the public good are non-inferior. By iii gyx =− we denote agent i 's contribution to the public good, which is the part of i 's income that is spent for providing the public good. By assuming a linear technology, which transforms one unit of private into one unit of public consumption, we can normalise 1 mrt = .
Thus any feasible allocation fulfils
which is a self-financing condition and corresponds to a balanced public budget. rather strange financing conditions for the public good. On the one hand, agent i must not suffer from having no private consumption. Hence, the mechanism M does not allow a full exploitation of agent i through the other agents. On the other hand, each agent does not get a free lunch and thus has to bear at least a small cost share of financing the public good.
Besides feasibility, we now want to impose some additional properties which the mechanism M should fulfil. As we are interested in an efficient and somehow fair mechanism, these conditions are meant to incorporate some basic normative ideas. The first axiom is the uncontroversial efficiency postulate.
Efficiency (EF):
The allocation 1 (,...,,)
MMM n xxG is Pareto optimal.
The axiom EF implies that for the allocation picked out by M the Samuelson condition holds, such that the sum of marginal rates of substitution of the n agents equals the marginal rate of transformation:
3 For an elementary proof of this result see Buchholz, Cornes and Peters (2005) .
(2)
The other class of axioms we are now going to formulate reflects equity considerations, which refer to agents' contributions (or cost shares) when financing the public good. To base equity directly on the individual contributions
g measured in units of the private good is clearly inappropriate, as this would not take different preferences for the public good into account -which does not seem fair. Spending the same amount of income for the public good means a higher subjective burden for an agent who does not receive much benefit from the public good and thus has a low willingness to pay for it 4 . A fair mechanism has to incorporate such concerns. To correct for the effect of different individual valuations, contributions have to be converted into commensurable equivalents before an equity maxim can reasonably be applied. This transformation is done in a standard way by applying the marginal rates of substitution of the different agents as virtual public-good prices 5 .
Equity may now be captured in various ways, so first by directly imposing the benefit principle 6 in its classical interpretation. As an equity maxim related to the Lindahl solution this is closest to the existing literature.
Benefit Principle (BP):
Under the mechanism M (,)
holds for all individuals.
This axiom means that every individual has to spend that share of its income for the public good, which -according to the individual's marginal willingness to pay -is equivalent to the amount of the public good provided under M 7 . In the sense of "value and countervalue", everyone pays what he gets. On competitive markets for private goods this benefit principle is automatically fulfilled which provides the basis for considering market exchange as just.
It is an important message of the present paper that BP can be deduced from other equity axioms that are related to concepts of a fair burden sharing among individuals, i.e. to distributional equity relative to the individual contributions.
Proportional Contributions (PC):
Under the mechanism M (,) (,)
holds for all pairs of individuals.
This axiom means that the cost shares of the agents in financing the public good are proportional to their marginal willingness to pay 8 . The higher an agent's willingness to pay of an agent, the higher is the contribution to the public good he should make if mechanism M is applied. In this sense, everyone pays according to his preferences for the public good whichseems to be a fair cost-sharing rule when agents are different. intuitive requirement of vertical equity as the agent with the higher interest in the public good has to pay more for it if PC is assumed.
As a contrasting example consider the case where the agents have general but identical preferences. Then vertical equity demands that the agent with the higher income makes a higher contribution to the public good, which -as a normative postulate -can also be interpreted as a variant of the venerable ability-to-pay-principle. If PC is assumed it follows from (4) that mechanism M has this property in case of normal preferences. (See the Appendix for a precise proof.) So in a public-good economy the axiom PC implies a close relationship between two essential norms for just taxation or just burden sharing: the benefit principle on the one hand and the ability-to-pay principle on the other.
The axiom PC can also be reformulated in a somewhat different way.
Equality of Sacrifice (ES): Under the mechanism
This axiom means that, under the mechanism , M everyone bears the same burden when financing the public good. Before a comparison of individual contributions is made the monetary contribution M i g of each agent i is normalised through an adjustment for different preferences such that the individual burden is measured in public-good equivalents. This axiom implies an "equal sacrifice" in private consumption for all agents involved.
The following result shows how these axioms can be combined to justify the Lindahl solution.
Proposition:
The following characterizations of the allocation mechanism M are equivalent: However, the Lindahl equilibrium is a distinct element within the whole set of symmetric allocations.
In the special case with two agents, condition (iv) of the Proposition can be illustrated in the standard diagram, where we depict agents' cost shares 1 g and 2 g on both axes (see Cornes and Sandler, 1996, p. 202 For some more detailed theoretical discussion on the relationship between the benefit principle and Lindahl equilibrium see Aaron and Mc Guire (1970) . line for which the tangent to both indifference curves passes through the origin (see Figure   1 ) 11 .
The axioms underlying the Proposition can slightly be weakened. So BP can be substituted by the postulate that under a mechanism M the inequality
holds for each agent. This means that no one should pay more for the public good than what he receives as a public-good equivalent. If condition (7) is now combined with EF we obtain condition (3), as otherwise . M This gives some reason to identify the Lindahl solution with the outcome of fair cooperation without using Lindahl's own bargaining model that is based on a rather specific and "unconvincing" construction (Silvestre, 2004, p. 528) . If the parties are fairness-oriented in a strict sense they will not accept an offer that removes them to a less advantageous position relative to the other parties 13 . In voluntary agreements, which are reached by truly fair negotiations, there is no tolerance for unilateral privileges. Only then can we legitimately suppose equal bargaining power with the parties, which has also been a crucial element in Lindahl's (1919/1958) approach 14 .
Conclusion
The purpose of the Lindahl concept is to find a cooperative solution for a public-good economy that is voluntarily accepted by all agents involved. Unanimous approval over publicgood supply, however, can only be expected when the parties consider the underlying costsharing rule as equitable. Even though fair burden sharing played a central role in Lindahl's own reasoning and the ensuing discussion of his approach, maxims concerning distributional equity are not explicitly used as the starting point for a motivation of the Lindahl equilibrium.
Therefore, our analysis first of all should be helpful for elucidating the Lindahl solution as a "normative concept" (see Varian, 1978 15 See Musgrave (1959, pp. 63-77) for an illuminating review of the history of economic thought concerning the relationship between contractual arrangements, or, specifically the "contract theory of the state", and equity according to the benefit principle. In particular, Musgrave in this context refers to A. Smith's first principle of taxation. 16 For arguments that might be relevant in this context see e.g., Musgrave (1959, p. 80) and Johansen (1977) .
Appendix Axiom PC and Ability to Pay
In the case of identical preferences (,) i xG π denotes the common mrs -function of all agents.
It follows from normality that (,) i xG π is increasing in i x given any arbitrary level of G such that private consumption and the marginal willingness to pay for the public good change in the same direction (see already Kovenock and Sadka, 1981) . As a consequence, the axiom PC, i.e. condition (4), implies that 
